I have finally finished another chapter of the Whitehead book — the one I had been hoping to finish in July. Here it is. (Once again, consumer warning: unrevised state, probably contains errors and lamenesses that will have to be attended to eventually).
For a bunch of the other chapters, plus additional published or unpublished work, go here.
Steve,
There are many thinkers who are working with newer concepts and applying them to self and apprehension of time, space, and objects. It’s interesting how each thinker approaches these obtuse subjects with different expressions. Do you think it’s necessary to justify (apologist for expressing in your idiolect) the disposition or tendency towards applying newer concepts?
The problems I foresee are based on the possibility of conceptualizing. I think of a toaster. I have a concept of a toaster. Toasters (most of them) work. My concept fails when imposed upon what we call a “toaster” onto an actual toaster (my toaster, for example). I would love to share a paper I’ve been working on if you have the time. But I would feel a bit naked posting it here.
Off the beaten path, a little Wittgenstein:
“One also says: I don’t understand this person’s joy and sadness. And what does that mean? Doesn’t it mean that as I understand the words he is actually not sad and not happy? And now what does it mean to say: Maybe exactly the same thing is going on within him as within me, only it is expressed differently?” Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: The Inner and the Outer Volume 2
Hi Steven,
Thanks for posting this chapter. You make a convincing case for a generous (re)reading of Kant, especially for his importance in Deleuze and Whitehead. Your clarity of expression is also something I would like to have.
I only have one comment, and that is with regard to omission of any reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, and especially their construction of a machinic ontology, which to a certain extent is carried on in A Thousand Plateaus. I mention this due to your discussion of subjectivity, which is a key theme in Anti-Oedipus, as they are trying to argue against a representational subject, but one immanently produced. What relation, or divergences, between Deleuze and Guattari’s machinic onotolgy have to a Whitehead ontology? Could Deleuzoguattarian machines not also be seen as singularities?
I ask this because I am curious why Anti-Oedious, at present, seems to get omitted or skimmed over when people discuss/analyse deleuze, which I feel is worrying trend as there is far more than a critique of psychoanalysis.
I don’t know much about Whitehead, but I really appreciated your chapter. The writing is very careful, and it gave me a good deal to think about. It seems I will have to pick up some Whitehead one of these weekends.
regards,